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Pricing to manage export channel relationships 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In a novel approach using agency theory, we conceptualize export pricing as price 
manipulations an exporter initiates to cope with the distributor-level, internal competition 
with the other product lines the distributor carries. We argue that suppliers can influence 
foreign resellers’ behaviors and therefore manage export channel relationships with prices. 
Using a sample of 283 exporter–importer relationships, we uncover the export price 
manipulations used to cope with internal competition, and we examine their impact on the 
exporter economic performance. We show that the performance effect of this pricing policy is 
achieved through the adequate role performance of the importer. Moreover, using a small but 
rare dyadic data set, we offer an additional test of the effectiveness of this form of pricing. 
Finally, by comparing the results of our study to exporters’ practice we show how they tend to 
overuse price discounts to motivate their overseas distributors. 
 
Keywords: Agency theory, Exporter-Importer relationships, Export marketing, Export 
pricing. 
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1. Introduction 
When exporters1 use foreign independent intermediaries to promote their brands in 
international markets, setting appropriate cross-border prices is crucial in the success or 
failure of export ventures. Previous research in exporting (Cavusgil, Chan, & Zhang, 2003; 
Lages & Montgomery, 2005; Myers & Harvey, 2001; Solberg, Stöttinger, & Yaprak, 2006; 
Sousa & Bradley, 2008, 2009; for a comprehensive review, see Tan & Sousa, 2011; Tzokas, 
Hart, Argouslidis, & Saren, 2000) has focused on export price setting and international price 
adaptation/standardization. 
To achieve adequate performance in foreign markets, existing research has highlighted 
among other influencing factors on export prices, the level of competition in the foreign 
market (e.g., Cavusgil & Zou, 1994; Lages & Montgomery, 2005; Myers, Cavusgil, & 
Diamantopoulos, 2002). While acknowledging the competitive intensity in the foreign market 
as important for an exporter’s pricing considerations, there is another competitive context, 
which is crucial in setting export prices, but which has received much less attention: the 
distributor-level competition. Indeed, importers2 (as most channels intermediaries) usually 
carry products from more than one supplier, giving them the freedom to decide which 
products to promote actively in the foreign market and which ones not to promote. As such, 
the importer has alternatives if it is not satisfied with the return of one range of products. This 
puts the exporter in a situation of internal3 competition with the importer’s other product 
lines.  
Managing a channel relationship successfully requires the supplier to overcome this 
internal competition and induce the reseller to dedicate appropriate efforts to promote its 
brand. To cope with the internal competition, exporters must come up with mechanisms that 
                                                     
1We also refer to exporters as suppliers. 
2We also refer to importers as resellers, intermediaries, or distributors, 
3 We refer to distributor-level competition as internal competition to contrast it with external (market-level) 
competition 
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provide the importer with superior benefits and keep the working relationship fruitful and 
lively (Hallén, Johanson, & Seyed-Mohamed, 1991). Some authors therefore speak of a 
customer relationship between the exporter and the importer (Lye & Hamilton, 2001; Solberg 
& Nes, 2002). Consequently, the exporter may use its pricing policy to motivate the support 
for their business relationship (Argouslidis & Indounas, 2010; Banerjee, Mark, Dutta, & Ray, 
2012; Cavusgil, 1996; Rosenbloom, 1990; Samiee, 1987).  
Our study contributes to the export literature because we use agency theory to unveil the 
price mechanisms a supplier employs to overcome internal (distributor-level) competition and 
achieve adequate performance with a foreign reseller. Agency theory has been used to explain 
the impact of monitoring on export channel relationships (see for example: Aulakh, Kotabe, & 
Sahay, 1996 and Bello & Gilliland, 1997). However, by studying the effect of export pricing 
on the management of channel relationships, this study brings a novel perspective to the 
export channel research. Our second contribution resides in a disaggregated measurement 
approach of export pricing that enables us to uncover which specific price manipulations4 are 
used to deal with internal competition.  We also highlight the prominent role of the foreign 
distributor in the export pricing–export performance relationship (Saleh, Ali, & Julian, 2014, 
Lye & Hamilton, 2001), when we posit the following: a supplier’s price manipulations aimed 
at mitigating the internal competition will fully unfold their impact on export performance 
only through the adequate role performance of the overseas intermediary. 
From a practical point of view, our approach yields usable recommendations for suppliers 
that employ independent intermediaries because we are able to suggest precise price 
manipulations that effectively manage channel relationships and improve export performance. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we provide a summary of the 
pertinent literature with a focus on the relevance of agency theory for our research question, 
                                                     
4 Price manipulations refer to the different settings of the pricing policy components adopted by an exporting 
firm. 
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and develop a series of research hypotheses in parallel. After outlining our methodology in 
detail, we present our results and conclude with a discussion on the research implications of 
our findings, before we outline how exporters may use our findings to more successfully 
manage their relations to importers through export price manipulations.  
2. Theory and hypotheses 
The export context epitomizes the distance between suppliers and their independent 
intermediaries because exporters do not have direct control over the local marketing policies 
for their products in foreign markets (Cavusgil, 1996; Myers & Cavusgil, 1996). Foreign 
intermediaries manage crucial issues such as direct customer contact or the choice of products 
to be promoted (Bello & Lohtia, 1995; Coughlan, Anderson, Stern, & El-Ansary, 2006; de 
Mortanges & Vossen, 1999; Frazier, Maltz, Antia, & Rindfleisch, 2009). As Liang and Parkhe 
(1997, p. 520) stress, the notion of an importer as an entity that, “at best, is thought to be a 
silent partner, and at worst, passive recipient of exporters’ offerings” is outdated. The foreign 
intermediary needs to be viewed as a partner in “what is a quintessentially two-sided 
exchange designed [primarily] to satisfy importers’ business needs.” 
Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay (1996) and Bello and Gilliland (1997) point to agency theory 
to explain export channels relationships. In domestic research on channels and control (e.g., 
Banerjee, Bergen, Dutta, & Ray, 2012; Lassar & Kerr, 1996) or sales force management 
(Frenzen, Hansen, Krafft, Mantrala, & Schmidt, 2010; Mishra & Prasad, 2005), agency theory 
has been used in a manufacturer (principal)–distributor/sales force (agent) context. However, 
to the best of our knowledge, the influence of pricing on agency issues has not been 
investigated in an export channels context. Yet Banerjee et al. (2012) contend that price 
premiums can be used to manage channel relationships. 
We focus on the cross-border price that the manufacturer sets for the independent importer 
(and not on the local pricing policy in the foreign market) because this part of the pricing 
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process is under the exporter’s direct control. In this sense, export pricing is defined as the 
price manipulations an exporter employs to motivate their distributors despite the internal 
(distributor-level) competition. These price manipulations are aimed at influencing importers’ 
behaviors in favor of the exporter’s offering. In the following discussion, we outline how 
pricing manipulations reflect principal–agent mechanisms. We capture our research 
contentions and related hypotheses in a conceptual model (see Fig. 1). 
An agency relationship is prevalent whenever one party: the principal (the exporter) 
depends on another party: the agent (the importer) to undertake some action on the principal’s 
behalf. To manage the relationship efficiently, agency theory establishes the optimal form of 
contract (agent compensation) between two parties (Eisenhardt, 1989) that aligns the 
exporter’s and the importer’s interests. In this context, the importer’s risk aversion plays a key 
role. In agency theory, the agent is defined as being risk averse (in contrast to the principal, 
who is usually mapped as risk neutral). The importer’s risk aversion may result from different 
reasons—for example, dependence on the exporter to supply attractive products at 
competitive prices (Lassar & Kerr, 1996) or limited flexibility to diversify its engagements 
after committing to an exporter (Bergen, Dutta & Walker, 1992). Risk also arises as the 
importer can only partly influence its economic performance in the market because 
uncontrollable effects such as competitor actions, governmental policies, or economic 
conditions similarly affect the business. To mitigate risk, the importer may develop a portfolio 
of products in the same or different product categories, thus creating a “menu” of potential 
revenue sources from which it can select the most rewarding (Bergen, et al., 1992; Lassar & 
Kerr, 1996). 
For the exporter, this establishes a situation of internal competition. Internal competition does 
not arise only because of the distributor carrying brands competing for the same market 
segment (for example: Peugeot vs. Volkswagen) or the same product category (Peugeot vs. 
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Lamborghini for example). Even brands in different product categories (trucks vs. cars) can 
become competitors when observed through the logic of internal competition. Indeed, internal 
competition does not depend on the competing nature of the products; it rather refers to the 
competition between several suppliers for one distributor’s efforts. To gain the importer’s 
attention, the exporter needs to provide attractive benefits to the importer (Bergen, et al., 
1992). Lassar and Kerr (1996) suggest offering incentives such as high margins and value 
transfers (e.g., product support payments, cooperative advertising). From an agency theory 
perspective, such incentives are supplemental revenues provided by the principal to the agent. 
Here, supplemental refers to revenues exceeding the agent’s reservation utility—that is, the 
usual margin the agent is getting from other suppliers. The export channel context presents an 
important difference with the classic agency setting. In a classic principal–agent relationship, 
the agent works for one principal at a time and therefore must terminate a contract before 
accepting a new one. In the channel setting, the distributor can take multiple contracts 
simultaneously. This increases the level of (internal) competition the exporter faces because 
the importer can have multiple alternative suppliers, and in this situation, the importer does 
not incur any switching cost for moving from one supplier to the other. Thus, the channel 
context requires the suppliers to provide incentives to their resellers if they want to secure a 
proper attention to their products. 
In line with Banerjee et al. (2012), we contend that export price manipulations can be 
assimilated to the provision of incentives to the importer by the exporter because they allow 
the exporter to offer supplemental revenues to the importer. Indeed, by manipulating cross-
border prices, exporters can increase the gains that their distributor achieve with their 
products to a level that is superior to what the reseller’s alternative suppliers can offer. The 
exporter expects these incentives to motivate the importer to focus on the exporter’s offering. 
By doing so, the importer maximizes its revenue.  
Thus, we derive the following hypotheses: 
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H1. Export price manipulations improve importer role performance. (price manipulations are 
for H1a: volume discounts, H1b: credit, H1c: exchange rate, H1d: new products special 
prices, H1e: superior margins) 
 
The agency theory perspective suggests that export price manipulations can be understood 
as incentives (Banerjee, et al., 2012). Thus, price manipulations can be effective only if the 
importer perceives them as appropriate and increases its efforts. If so, the importer reacts to 
the exporter’s proposal and performs accordingly to support the exporter’s business in the 
foreign market (Kim & Frazier, 1997). With a strong effort from its local representative, the 
exporter can achieve good performance. Therefore, we propose a mediating role of the 
importer response in the link between export pricing and export performance.  
Regarding conceptualization of the importer’s response to the exporter’s price 
manipulations, we view the importer’s role performance as a key factor. While role 
performance has been used mainly in relation to the exporter (e.g., Kumar & Bergstrom, 
2008; Skarmeas, Katsikeas, Spyropoulou, & Salehi-Sangari, 2008), we agree with Frazier 
(1983) that for a fruitful dyadic relationship, role performance needs to work both ways. 
When two firms engage in a business relationship, each assumes certain tasks and 
responsibilities and relies on the other party to reciprocate on the basis of the respective 
channel position (Frazier, 1983). Thus, we contend that the exporter’s price manipulations 
motivate the importer to maintain the exchange relationship and fulfill its role accordingly 
(Kumar & Bergstrom, 2008). Moreover, Frazier (1983, p. 159) argues that “when actual 
exchanges of products, services, and information begin, the role performance of each firm 
(how well a channel role is actually carried out) will determine, in a large part, the outcomes, 
both actual and perceived, achieved in the relationship (e.g., sales, profits).” In other words, 
adequate importer role performance leads to exporter economic performance. Agency theory 
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assumptions determine our conceptual model as we predict that appropriate agent 
compensation (provided through the export pricing policy) increases agent effort (the 
distributor role performance) which in turn increases the principal benefits (the exporter 
economic performance).  In light of these considerations, we put forth our second hypothesis 
(see Figure 1): 
 
H2. Importer role performance mediates the impact of export price manipulations on exporter 
economic performance. 
 
Figure1. Conceptual Model 
 
3. Research method 
We tested our hypotheses on a sample of French exporters. We used structural models to 
assess the impact of export pricing on exporter performance. The analyses were performed 
with AMOS7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Export Price 
Manipulations 
Price1: rebates 
Price2: credit 
Price3: exchange rate 
Price4: new products 
Price5: superior margins 
 
Importer Role 
Performance 
Exporter Economic 
Performance 
(+) (+) 
(0) 
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3.1. Sampling and sample characteristics 
From a database built by French regional chambers of commerce containing 32,500 
exporters, we selected a random sample of 1036 industrial firms based on the following 
criteria recommended for export surveys: The firms had more than 10 employees, exported at 
least 10% of their total revenues to more than three countries, and used independent foreign 
distributors. We contacted them by telephone and asked them to complete the questionnaire 
and submit it either by fax or online. We asked respondents to base their answers on a 
business relationship with one of their foreign distributors. To introduce adequate variation in 
the answers, we divided the sample into three groups. We asked the first group to focus on the 
relationship with one of their two largest overseas representatives, the second group to 
respond with regard to their third- or fourth-largest foreign distributor, and the third group to 
respond with regard to one of their smallest export ventures. Indeed, firms behaviors tend to 
vary according to the importance of their distributor. 
We checked respondents’ competence in several ways. First, the database of exporters is 
built by the local chambers of commerce export specialists, who know the export staff of 
these companies personally. Second, we verified information included in the database through 
telephone calls to each potential respondent. Third, we included in the questionnaire a 
respondent competency test developed by Morgan, Kaleka, and Katsikeas (2004), which 
included four questions with scores from 1 to 7. We eliminated any respondent who scored 
less than 4 on one question or had an average score to the four questions of less than 5 from 
the survey. We eliminated three questionnaires because of low competency scores. We 
included a total of 283 questionnaires (5 firms provided answers for two different business 
relationships) from 278 firms (sample size: 1036, response rate of 26.8%) in the data set. 
Following Mentzer, Flint, and Hult’s (2001) guidelines, we assessed nonresponse bias. 
We contacted a random sample of 50 nonrespondents and asked them to answer five 
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questions corresponding to one item from each of the scales. The t-tests of group means 
revealed no differences between nonrespondents and respondents. Thus, we did not consider 
nonresponse bias a problem in the current study. 
Firms belonged to 19 of the 21 industrial categories recorded in France statistical system. 
Of these firms, 80% were small or medium-sized enterprises with fewer than 250 employees 
(European Commission, 2005), and exports generated an average of 34.4% of their revenues. 
Of the respondents, 89% belonged to the top management of their respective firm (43% were 
export managers, 24% were general managers, and 22% were marketing managers), and 11% 
were export area managers. On average, respondents had been personally responsible for the 
focal business relationship for 6 years. 
3.2. Measurement 
All items used in the measurement instruments appear in the Appendix .We derived five 
single indicators from field interviews and the literature to assess the possible price 
manipulations that exporters use to set their export prices. Export price manipulations items 
were derived from Cavusgil, Chan and Zhang (2003), Leonidou, Katsikeas, and Samiee 
(2002); Myers, Cavusgil, and Diamantopoulos (2002) and Piercy, Katsikeas and Cravens 
(1997) whose research synthesizes export pricing components. The five items assess all 
export price manipulations described in these articles. These manipulations are performed in 
order to provide volume discounts, special credit terms, exchange rate variations shield, 
special conditions for new products and superior margins for the importer. We checked that 
the aforementioned behaviors were the most common price manipulations performed by 
exporters (1) by the examination of the export pricing literature and (2) by the assessment of 
eight export managers and four export marketing scholars. We decided not to bundle them 
into a single variable so that we may assess the consequences of each of these pricing 
behaviors separately. In addition, it is important to note that the simple behaviors described by 
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each item do not require multiple indicators to be assessed (for a discussion of this topic, see 
Diamantopoulos et al., 2012).  
Second, we used two reflective scales to assess the importer role performance (Kumar, 
Stern, & Achrol, 1992) and the exporter economic performance (Bello & Gilliland, 1997). For 
these scales, we calculated the standardized loading of each indicator, the composite 
reliability index (ρf, see Appendix), and the variance extracted (ρvc, see Appendix). The 
constructs exhibit indexes that are superior to the reference values (ρf = .6, ρvc = .5). 
The correlations between the main constructs appear in Table 1. It shows that the scales 
achieved discriminant validity with correlations inferior to 0.70 (and ρvc ≥ .5, Fornell and 
Larcker 1981). 
Table 1: Correlations between constructs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Exporter Economic Performance .78      
(2)Importer Role Performance .65 .75     
(3)Price1 (volume discounts) .04 .04 1    
(4)Price2 (credit) .04 .04 .37 1   
(5)Price3 (exchange rate) .03 .09 .08 .06 1  
(6)Price4 (new products) .13 .14 .48 .35 .01 1 
(7)Price5 (superior margins) .14 .18 .48 .35 .01 .31 
Notes:  
Average variances extracted (ρvc) of reflective instruments appear in bold, and 
nonsignificant correlations appear in italics. 
With n = 283, correlations are significant at p ≤ .05, if they are ≥ .1. 
 
4. Results 
In this section, we present our findings on how export price manipulations mitigate 
internal competition and influence importer effort (H1) and how this effort affects the 
exporter’s economic performance (H2). To substantiate and deepen their explanatory power, 
we complement our findings with a post hoc analysis. 
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To test H1, we specified a structural model (see Fig. 1) to determine what export price 
manipulations influence importer’s role performance. The specific price manipulations 
(Price1–5) appear in the Appendix. Four variables (Price1–4) displayed nonsignificant 
coefficients. Only Price5 (superior margins) has an influence on importer role performance. 
Thus, the results support H1e, but not H1a, H1b, H1c and H1d (see Table 2 for a summary). 
 
Table 2: Influence of Export Price Manipulations on Importer Role Performance (H1) 
 
    Path 
coefficient 
t-value* 
H1a Price1 (volume discounts)   
Importer 
Role 
Performance 
-.03 -.40 
H1b Price2 (credit)  -.01 -.20 
H1c Price3 (exchange rate)  .09 1.34 
H1d Price4 (new products)  .11 1.37 
H1e Price5 (superior margins)  .15 2.20 
- Price1 (volume discounts)   
 
Exporter  
Economic 
Performance 
-.02 -.37 
- Price2 (credit)  .01 .13 
- Price3 (exchange rate)  -.05 -1.13 
- Price4 (new products)  .03 .59 
- Price5 (superior margins)  -.01 -.23 
- Importer Role Performance  .64 14.8 
Fit indexes 
χ2 = .91, d.f. = 38, p = .00; GFI = .94; NFI = .94; TLI = .94; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .08 
Notes: t: significant at p ≤ .05, if |t| ≥ 1.96; nonsignificant coefficients appear in italics. 
 
To test H2, we conduct a formal test of the mediating effect of importer role performance 
following procedures that Baron and Kenny (1986) and Shrout and Bolger (2002) 
recommend. We had to show (1) that the respective links of export price manipulations–
importer role performance and export pricing–exporter economic performance were both 
significant and (2) that when we specified the link between importer role performance and 
exporter economic performance, the relationship between pricing and exporter economic 
performance became nonsignificant (full mediation) or significantly weaker (partial 
mediation). This required us to evaluate both a mediated model and a direct model (see Table 
3) with one exogenous variable at a time (in this case Price5, superior margins). We first 
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compared the two models’ fit statistics. With a degree-of-freedom difference of 1, a chi-
square difference of 3.84 would indicate a better fit for the mediated model. The large chi-
square difference (213) shows that the mediated model is a better fit with the data. 
Furthermore, when we examined the mediated model, the two significant links between 
export pricing and importer role performance and between importer role performance and 
export performance and the nonsignificant link between superior margins and export 
performance indicate that importer role performance fully mediates the relationship between 
the two aforementioned variables. This means that the entire effect of superior margins on 
exporter performance is achieved through importer role performance. 
Table 3: Impact of export price manipulations (superior margins) on export 
performance—mediating effect of importer role performance. 
 
 
Mediated model 
  Path 
coefficient 
t-value* 
 
Price5  
(superior margins)  Importer role  performance .18 2.70 
Importer role 
performance  Exporter economic performance .65 14.01 
Price5  
(superior margins)  Exporter economic performance -.01 -.10 
Fit indexes 
χ2 = .49, d.f. = 18, p = .00; GFI = .95; NFI = .96; TLI = .97; CFI = .98; RMSEA = .08 
Direct model   
Path 
coefficient 
t-value* 
 
Price5  
(superior margins)  Importer role performance .18 2.67 
 
Price5  
(superior margins) 
         
 Exporter economic performance .15 2.21 
Fit Indexes 
χ2 = 262, d.f. = 19, p = .00; GFI = .85; NFI = .81; TLI = .74; CFI = .82; RMSEA = .22 
Notes: t: significant at p ≤ .05 if |t| ≥ 1.96; nonsignificant coefficients appear in italics. 
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4.1. Common method variance (CMV) 
We took several steps to mitigate potential CMV problems. Regarding questionnaire 
design, (1) we advised respondents that there were no good or bad answers and that they 
should answer candidly, (2) we scattered reflective items around the questionnaire so 
respondents could not identify items describing the same factor, and (3) we used semantic 
differential scales and frequently changed Likert scale anchors. Next, we performed and 
passed a Harmon single-factor test with the reflective variables (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). 
Finally, we created an unmeasured latent construct (Model 3a in Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Jeong-Yeon, & Podsakoff, 2003), inserted it in the mediated model, and allowed the reflective 
manifest indicators to load on their respective theoretical constructs and on the unmeasured 
construct. This allows for the control of systematic measurement error on the relationships 
between the latent constructs. All the hypothesized interconstruct relationships remained 
significant, which suggests that common method bias does not affect the results of our 
analysis. 
 
4.2. Post hoc analyses 
We performed two post-hoc analyses. The first one aimed at confirming the results of the 
study which is based on exporters’ answers. Thus, we asked importers if superior margins 
increased their efforts in favor of an exporter’s products. The second analysis investigates the 
actual practices of exporters when they want to motivate their foreign distributors. Indeed, by 
comparing exporters’ pricing behaviors with those behaviors that are proven to be effective, 
we can issue even more useful practical recommendations. 
Our results provide evidence that export price manipulations targeted at the distributor-
level (internal) competition realize their full effect through the importer’s role performance. 
Therefore, it was interesting to observe from the point of view of the importer whether the 
exporter’s incentives achieve their objectives and entice relevant importer support. To 
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confirm this impact, we collected dyadic data relating exporters’ pricing behaviors to 
importers’ actions. We asked the respondents from our survey to provide the telephone 
number and e-mail addresses of the importer they were assessing in their answers. Only 100 
exporters agreed to provide this information. Subsequently, we contacted the importers by e-
mail and telephone to invite them to respond to a short questionnaire on a dedicated website. 
A total of 38 respondents from 25 countries completed the questionnaire. They indicated on a 
scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) their opinion regarding the following two 
statements, describing their behaviors in favor of the exporter: “We have invested a great deal 
in building up the business with this exporter.” (item a), and “We have made a substantial 
investment in order to market this exporter’s product lines.” (item b). Given the small data set 
(38 dyads), we ruled out structural equations modeling and instead used regression with SPSS 
for this analysis. Using the two items (a and b) assessing importer actions, we built a factor 
and regressed the scores of Price5 (superior margins) on this factor. The analysis indicated 
that superior margins reached their objective because they were significantly related to 
importer’s increased efforts (r = .31, t = 4.03). The small size of our dyadic sample demands a 
cautious interpretation of these results, yet they nonetheless contribute to the assessment of 
the effectiveness of export price manipulations. 
The second post-hoc analysis was designed to answer the following question: “What price 
behaviors do exporters adopt when they want to motivate their foreign distributors to increase 
their effort?” Using an approach similar to MIMIC modeling (see Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer, 2001) we specified a model where the five price manipulations (Price1-5) were 
regressed on a latent variable with two reflective indicators assessing the intentions of the 
exporter: “Our policies encourage this importer to increase their marketing efforts on our 
products” and “Our policies encourage this importer to sell more of our products.” Three 
pricing behaviors (Price1–3) displayed nonsignificant coefficients, and we eliminated them, 
one at a time, from the model. The two reflective indicators loaded adequately (standardized 
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loadings of .79 and .97 respectively). The final model included the two price manipulations 
that displayed significant path coefficients—Price4 (support to launch new products: r = .33, t 
= 4.61) and Price5 (superior margins: r = .15, t = 2.42)—and the two reflective indicators. 
Hence, when they want to overcome internal competition and motivate their distributors, 
exporters offer special prices for new products and superior margins. 
4.3 Summary of the findings 
Our results indicate that among the five export price manipulations that we examined, only 
superior margins improve importer role performance (H1e supported). Furthermore, we find 
that importer role performance increases exporter economic performance. In other words: 
importer role performance fully mediates the influence of superior margins on exporter 
economic performance (H2 is supported). Additionally, using dyadic data in a post-hoc 
analysis, importers data indicated that superior margins induce them to promote the exporter’s 
products strengthening the support for H1. The results of the second post-hoc analysis suggest 
that when exporters seek to overcome internal competition and encourage their foreign 
distributors to focus their efforts on their products, they provide their representatives with 
special conditions -low prices and credit facilities- for new products along with superior 
margins. Comparing the findings on H1 with this last post-hoc test suggests that exporters 
tend to overuse price manipulations as only one of them (superior margins) has proven to be 
effective in our study. 
 
5. Discussion 
In this paper, we show how export pricing can help suppliers manage their channel 
relationships with foreign resellers. Specifically, we investigated how export price 
manipulations contribute to mitigating internal (distributor-level) competition and how this 
allows exporters to achieve economic performance. This core contribution is based on an 
agency theory framework that suits particularly well international channels arrangements. 
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Agency theory proposes two mechanisms to manage principal-agent relationships: monitoring 
(see, for example Aulakh, et al., 1996; Bello & Gilliland, 1997 for the exporting context) and 
incentives. Focusing on the latter, we provided evidence that export price manipulations allow 
the exporter to offer incentives to the importer which in turn increase the latter’s commitment 
to the exporter’s product portfolio. According to Gilliland’s (2003) classification of B2B-
channel incentives, export price manipulations can be thus seen as activity incentives 
(Gilliland, 2003)—that is, rewards provided by the exporter to the importer to promote 
activities that support the exporter’s brand. 
When it comes to the most effective incentive to mitigate internal competition, superior 
margins stand out. Unlike other frequently used price manipulations, they are the only means 
according to our results, which provide the supplemental revenues needed to motivate the 
importer. Our dyadic analysis supports this finding: importers find superior margins attractive, 
when it comes to incentives that would make them favor one exporter’s offering over another. 
Compared to these results, exporters may have to adjust their current contentions, as they 
believe not only superior margins but also special support for new products as effective, as 
our post-hoc analysis shows. 
Another objective in this paper was to highlight the role of the importer in the export 
pricing-export performance relationship. Our results demonstrate that importer role 
performance fully mediates the impact of superior margins on performance. These findings 
clearly highlight that incentives provided by the exporter will only pan out as intended, if the 
distributor acknowledges them as such and acts accordingly. These results are also in line 
with agency theory which contends that agents’ compensation schemes work only if they 
provide the beneficiaries with a revenue superior to their utility reservation.   
Taken collectively, our results clearly demonstrate that in addition to being the monetary 
counterpart in an exchange, prices can be used as a vector to influence intermediaries’ 
behaviors and manage export channel relationships.  
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From a managerial perspective, our results provide export managers with various directions 
for action. Preliminary interviews showed that exporters have a limited understanding of 
internal competition. Indeed, it is important to distinguish internal competition from external 
competition which is based on competing offers in the foreign market place. Internal 
competition has a significant influence on the performance of firms that rely on foreign 
intermediaries in their exporting activities. Importers take advantage of internal competition 
to promote product ranges which offer them additional revenue and neglect other brands in 
their portfolio where this is not the case. They compose a portfolio of favorite items that are 
actively promoted. The remaining products are often left unattended. This behavior denotes 
an additional manifestation of the goal divergence that exists between supplier and reseller. 
Because the importer maximizes its profit and minimizes its effort, the exporter cannot 
achieve its sales objectives for all its products ranges. This study shows that to secure 
adequate performance, exporters can overcome internal competition issues with a well-
designed pricing policy. In particular, we highlight the effectiveness of higher margins.  
Our findings indicate the strong role of the foreign intermediary in the effectiveness of a 
pricing policy. Price manipulations should be crafted to provide importers with enough 
supplemental benefits so they will dedicate appropriate efforts to promote the exporter’s 
brand. It is essential that suppliers understand that not all pay-per-performance schemes are 
incentives. Indeed, in a situation of internal competition only the compensation schemes that 
offer more than the other suppliers of the distributor are effective.  
Our study shows that this holds particularly true for superior margins, which seem to work 
well in the context of internal competition, while other common price manipulations failed to 
reach their goal. Exporters need to carefully consider their incentive schemes, when they want 
to motivate their distributors, so as not to waste their resources.  
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In addition, a shift in perspective from the importer being a passive recipient of the exporter’s 
strategic decisions to being an active partner in a balanced business relationship will support a 
more effective export pricing policy and ultimately export performance.  
6. Limitations and directions for future research 
While we believe that our novel approach provides a substantially new perspective on and 
intriguing insights into export pricing, we acknowledge its limitations, which may be 
overcome in further research. First, we investigated how exporters mitigate internal 
competition and what pricing actions they implement to achieve their performance objectives 
despite this competition. We were not able to measure exporters’ comparative performance 
(compared with other brands in the importer’s portfolio), because exploratory interviews with 
exporters determined that they did not possess a sufficient level of information to assess 
performance comparatively. We urge researchers to replicate our work in different, more 
appropriate contexts (industries or national) to determine whether price manipulations not 
only secure adequate performance but also help achieve superior results. 
Moreover, we assumed a power balance between the exchange partners in their ongoing 
business relationship. However, there are many cases in which the supplier and reseller do not 
share the same degree of dependence (Frazier, et al., 2009). Because this may bias our 
findings in one direction or the other depending which party is more powerful in the 
exchange, further research is necessary to address this aspect. 
In this work, we focused our perspective on export pricing in ongoing exporter–importer 
relationships. This might be the reason why some of the price components (e.g., credit terms, 
exchange rate mitigation schemes) turned out to be nonsignificant, as they are dealt with at 
the beginning of an international business relationship. Therefore, investigating exporter–
importer business relationships at different stages may help elucidate the phenomenon of 
export pricing in more depth. A different phenomenon may explain the nonsignificant results 
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concerning volume discounts. Indeed, Blattberg and Neslin (1990) contend that, if they abuse 
of price discounts, sellers can fall into a situation in which buyers wait for these discounts to 
make their purchase and thus demand systematically lower prices. This contention should be 
verified empirically in the export context. 
In our approach, we disaggregated export pricing into individual manipulations, which 
enabled us to develop tailored actions to deal with internal competition. Further research may 
use this approach to isolate price manipulations effective for different markets (e.g., emerging 
vs. mature markets), different customer types (e.g., wholesalers vs. end retailers), or different 
market/product units. Moreover, export price manipulations are only one incentive an 
exporter can take to motivate an overseas agent. To fully capture the exporter’s incentive 
portfolio, it may be useful to extend our work beyond export pricing and include other 
marketing-mix elements, such as product or promotion incentives (Gilliland, 2003). 
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Appendix : Measures 
Export Price Manipulations 
(Single Measures) 
Cavusgil, Chan & Zhang (2003), Leonidou, Katsikeas, & Samiee (2002); 
Myers,Cavusgil, & Diamantopoulos (2002); Piercy, Katsikeas, & Cravens (1997) 
Price1 We propose volume discounts to this importer. 
Price2 We offer this importer favorable credit terms. 
Price3 We try to compensate exchange rates fluctuations for this importer. 
Price4 We propose this importer special discounts and credit terms to help them launch our 
new products. 
Price5 Our pricing policy aims at granting this importer higher margins than (what they get 
from) their other suppliers. 
Importer Role Performance 
(Reflective Scale, ρvc = .75 ρf = .93) 
Kumar, Stern, & Achrol (1992) 
Imperf1 Our association with this importer has been a highly successful one. (Loading: .90) 
Imperf2 If I had to give this importer an appraisal for its performance these last years, it 
would be: 1 = poor, 7 = outstanding. (Loading: .82) 
Imperf3 This importer leaves a lot to be desired from an overall performance stand point. (R) 
(Loading: .69) 
Imperf4 Overall, how would characterize the results of your firm’s business relationship with 
this importer? 1 = It has fallen far short of expectations, 7 = It has greatly exceeded 
our expectations. (Loading: .87) 
Exporter Economic Performance 
(Reflective Scale, ρvc = .78 ρf = .91) 
Bello & Gilliland (1997) 
Experf1 Our sales goals were attained. (Loading: .89) 
Experf2 Our profit goals were attained. (Loading: .86) 
Experf3 Our market share goals were attained. (Loading: .90) 
Notes: (R) = reverse-scored item. 
 
